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Adrian Horridge has written an interesting, 
useful, and very opinionated book on the 
visual system of insects. He states that it 
could be used by university students inter-
ested in the physiology of vision or the psy-
chology of perception, by entomologists or 
zoologists, by engineers interested in robot 
vision, and by philosophers interested in the 
scientiﬁ  c method.
The book is actually several small books 
in one. It is a history of neuroethological 
research on insect vision, a functional anat-
omy of insect visual systems, a compila-
tion of his own studies on pattern vision 
of bees, and a critique of the scientiﬁ  c 
reasoning of other workers in the ﬁ  eld. 
The author deserves great praise for pub-
lishing the book in an open access mode. 
While hardcopy books may be purchased, 
it is freely available in pdf format on the 
web at http://epress.anu.edu.au/honey-
bee_ citation.html.
Unfortunately, his critique of fellow 
workers in this ﬁ  eld is often harsh, and his 
dismissal of their work is frequently written, 
as the post-modernist historians would say, 
“from a presentist point of view”. It is also 
often both eccentric and extreme. For exam-
ple: “In a topic such as vision, an analytical 
mathematical theory is not appropriate” (p. 
XV). “The second corrosive inﬂ  uence (the 
ﬁ  rst was gestalt psychology) was the devel-
opment of ethology by Konrad Lorenz and 
Niko Tinbergen, who used intuitive con-
cepts such as ‘fear’ and ‘drive’ ” (p. 31). “The 
whole subject (of bee’s visual discrimina-
tion) was dominated by German biologists 
who somehow thought that empiricism was 
immoral” (p. 32). “In the case of vision, the 
exact relation between input and output is 
even less useful. In the bee, these searches 
for exact relations between the features of 
the pattern and the percentage of correct 
responses hampered progress.” (p. 33).
I have cited a few of these dismissive state-
ments now as a warning to the reader. If one 
manages to ignore such comments, there is 
much to be learned from the book.
The book has 12 chapters for which 
Horridge provides summaries. Brieﬂ  y they 
are: Chapter 1. Early German work, 2. A 
discourse on scientiﬁ  c method, 3. German 
work from 1950 on. 4. Work of von Frisch 
and other behaviorists, 5. and 6. Anatomy 
and physiology of insects’ visual systems. 
7. Australian work on the visual control of 
ﬂ  ight, 8. Von Frisch’s work on navigation. 
9. Work in Horridge’s laboratory on feature 
detectors. 10. Theory of bee goal recogni-
tion. 11. and 12. On whether or not bees see 
shapes. These chapters are followed by two 
other sections labeled “Afterthoughts” and 
“Summary of the model of the bees’ visual 
processing”. A short summary of the prin-
cipal arguments of his theory of bee pattern 
recognition and some of the historical work 
underlying it is provided in a recent review 
(Horridge, 2009).
In this review I have concentrated on 
Horridge’s own researches and the history 
leading up to them in chapters 1, 3, 4, 9, 10 
and 11. To understand the main thrust of 
this research, it is best to start at the end with 
the author’s ﬁ  nal summary model. This is 
because most the rest of the book may be 
seen as a defense of this model, the discov-
ery of the information needed to support 
it, and a critique of all other research that 
did not lead to it.
Brieﬂ  y, Horridge’s theory states that the 
bee eye consists of a very large number of 
small groups of seven omnitidia that act in 
concert as various kinds of feature, or “cue” 
detectors. He distinguishes two kinds of fea-
ture detectors: phasic  modulation  detectors 
that detect heterochromatic, temporal 
modulation and tonic detectors of edge ori-
entation. A number of these small groups 
form a “local area” of 15 to 30 degrees in 
width, and “Within each region no more 
than one cue of each kind [presumably pha-
sic or tonic] is detected” (p. 317). Horridge 
states that there are few kinds of cues, and he 
lists the order of their preference for learn-
ing: “…total modulation in a local area (is) 
the most preferred, then area, position of 
a centre, a black spot, colour, radial edges, 
bilateral symmetry, average orientation and 
ﬁ  nally tangential or circular edges, which 
(latter) are avoided.” (p. 314). Groups of 
cues detected at the same time form the 
“label” of a landmark, and this label can 
be learned. Such cues are retinotopic and a 
group of landmark labels at wide angles to 
each other makes “the key to the recognition 
of place”. It will be seen that this division 
into small angle and wide angle visual ﬁ  elds 
is important in understanding the apparent 
contradictions in experimental results.
The data for Horridge’s model were 
obtained using a behavioral paradigm 
that was initiated by Hertz (1929), whose 
work Horridge reviews. In her experi-
ments, bees were shown various pairs of 
black and white patterns on a horizontal 
surface, and were rewarded for going to 
one of these patterns. Then the reward was 
removed and either the pattern to which 
the bee was trained, or the unrewarded pat-
tern was exchanged for a pattern of similar 
but not identical characteristics. She then 
observed whether or not the bees’ visiting 
behavior changed. The orientation of the 
table relative to the surrounding landmarks 
was varied at   random. Hertz realized that 
there might be an untrained attractiveness Howland  Pattern recognition in bees
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or repulsiveness to a particular pattern, and 
found this in the relative ease of training 
bees to such forms. She also discovered: (1) 
that bees   distinguished between strongly 
branched or entire patterns (e.g. between a 
cross and a solid circle) (2) That among the 
solid patterns they distinguished between 
those with smooth and undulating con-
tours (e.g. a solid circle and a cog-wheel) 
(3) Among the branched patterns they 
distinguished between those with many 
and few branches. Hertz emphasized the 
fact that, as there was no ﬁ  xation point, 
the bees could approach the patterns from 
any direction, and thus there was no pos-
sibility that the bees could use a particular 
retinal location for analyzing the sensory 
data (Hertz, 1929, p. 698). Thus her early 
experiments differed from Horridge’s and 
others’ experiments where the bees could 
only view vertical patterns from a small 
range of ﬁ  xed distances in a two choice 
maze, and where the hole leading to the 
reward always formed a ﬁ  xation point.
Hertz concluded that, in agreement with 
gestalt theory, the forms were distinguished 
as totalities according to the relationships 
of their sensory data, and that a “form 
sense” was conclusively proven (“zwingend 
erwiesen”) (Hertz, 1929, p. 731). Horridge 
criticizes Hertz for classifying patterns 
“…by arbitrary global characters such as 
symmetry, disruption, isotropy, smooth-
ness, texture, variability of patch size, and 
separation into parts”, noting that “There 
was, however, no demonstration that these 
categories really had any meaning for the 
bees (p. 10).” This criticism is difﬁ  cult to 
understand when Hertz’s classiﬁ  cation is 
compared with Horridge’s listing of pre-
ferred cues above. Since both Hertz and 
Horridge have shown that bees respond to 
these cues, it must be that Horridge is using 
the word “meaning” above to refer to the 
lack of some process in the bee’s brain that 
he associates with Hertz’s gestalt hypothesis. 
And with this realization we come to the 
crux of Horridge’s problems with scientiﬁ  c 
reasoning.
On the one hand, despite the fact that 
the real data for his theory of pattern rec-
ognition is based on behavioral experiments 
alone, he does not seem to appreciate the 
limitation of his behavioral methods to 
differentiate among the myriad of ways 
such choice behavior could be instantiated 
in the nervous system. One of the   possible 
ways, that behavioral experiments have 
neither conﬁ  rmed nor falsiﬁ  ed, is that the 
bee’s learning process stores and classiﬁ  es 
groups of visual cues associated with train-
ing patterns, and compares the incoming 
sensory data with these classiﬁ  ed groups. 
But whether or not the bee used such a 
scheme, the question of “meaning” within 
the brain of the insect would appear to be 
unanswerable, along with other questions 
of qualia.
The assumption of the identity of 
the qualia of individual humans, based 
on their descriptions of them, underlies 
and provides support for gestalt theory. 
Hertz applied gestalt theory to insects 
where such description does not exist 
and where, given the great evolutionary 
distance between humans and insects, 
any assumption about qualia or mean-
ing seems unwarranted. However, what 
Horridge does not seem to appreciate is 
that it was the impetus from gestalt the-
ory that gave rise to Hertz’s fundamental 
experiments that have served as the para-
digm for the ﬁ  eld ever since.
The experimental method of Hertz 
has been modiﬁ  ed and reﬁ  ned over time. 
Hertz’s experiments were performed on 
a horizontal table and the patterns were 
rotated at random. Horridge remarks that 
“…the bees did not correlate edge orienta-
tions with their sun compass as they ﬂ  ew in 
all directions over them.” However he misses 
the point that they could not have corre-
lated them with their sun compass because 
the table on which the patterns were dis-
played was rotated at random during the 
experiments.
Horridge brieﬂ   y reviews Rudiger 
Wehner’s work which ﬁ  gured prominently 
in subsequent investigations of bee pattern 
recognition. In 1968 Wehner introduced 
a transparent screen between the targets 
and the bee, which could only approach 
the reward through a tunnel. This insured 
that there was a minimum distance from 
which the bee could view the target, which, 
in this apparatus provided a 130º view 
of the target. Subsequently in Horridge’s 
laboratory the minimum and maximum 
distances were also controlled using a “Y” 
maze with an antechamber in front of the 
transparent partition (Figure 1.1, p. 6). His 
apparatus provided a 27º view of the target. 
Wehner using wide-angle cross and parallel 
line targets found that the bees’ responses to 
targets which differed by 4º in orientation 
were signiﬁ  cantly different. However, using 
narrower angle targets of 42º, Srinivasan 
et al. (1994) also showed that bees could not 
distinguish between an upright cross and 
the same cross rotated by 45º. Srinivasan 
explained this result by assuming that the 
crosses were detected by orientation chan-
nels that had half widths of 90º. These 
experiments revealed the essential differ-
ence between large angle and narrow angle 
vision in the bee.
Horridge, having rejected Hertz’s gestalt 
theories as anthropomorphism, does not 
hesitate to criticize his colleagues when they 
stray in the direction of gestalt theories of 
visual recognition. Chen et al. (2003) con-
ducted a number of experiments to test the 
theory that bees could distinguish between 
the topological properties of closed and 
open ﬁ  gures, for example between O’s and 
S’s. They demonstrated that bees, trained 
with rewarded closed O patterns paired with 
unrewarded open S patterns, transferred 
this learning to pairs of closed squares vs. 
open X’s, and to closed O’s vs. solid circles. 
as well as open O’s vs. otherwise solid circles 
with four open holes. However they did not 
discriminate between closed O and closed 
square patterns. Chen et al. also showed that 
bees could be trained to positive S patterns 
and that they could distinguish between 
closed θ patterns against S patterns even 
where the test symbols were rotated 45° from 
the training position. They also showed that 
the topologically similar patterns had very 
different two-dimensional Fourier spectra, 
while topologically different patterns had 
very similar Fourier spectra.
In a set of ingenious experiments Horridge 
showed that the O vs. S discrimination could 
be explained by simple avoidance cues, 
namely black near the reward hole (always 
in the center of the patterns) and an edge 
orientation at a certain position. However 
this explanation could not explain why Chen 
et al’s. results that, after training on rewarded 
O’s and unrewarded S’s, the bees signiﬁ  cantly 
favored O vs. a solid circle, O vs. a square, or 
a θ vs. an S, both rotated 45° to the left. Thus 
Horridge’s theory could explain many, but 
not all of Chen et al’s results.
It will be noted that Horridge’s experi-
mental apparatus limited the testing of 
behavior to two alternative forced choices 
of vertical targets viewed through narrow 
angles (mostly 30º or less). He has little to Howland  Pattern recognition in bees
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say about the behavior of bees that distin-
guish between targets presented at larger 
angles, or targets that are not vertical, or 
that are presented at varying distances He 
simply describes targets viewed at large 
angles as “place recognition” or the learn-
ing of multiple landmarks and leaves it at 
that. (For a recent experiment using wide 
angle (up to 67°) targets that explores the 
discrimination and categorization of face-
like stimuli in honeybees the reader may 
consult Avarguès-Weber et al., 2010).
Elsewhere in his book (pp. 55–59), 
Horridge criticizes Reichardt and his col-
leagues for studying the optomotor reﬂ  ex 
of insects when the insect’s head is tethered. 
However, he seems unaware of the fact that 
his own work has progressed by making 
just this sort of simpliﬁ  cation, forcing the 
bees to view only narrow angle targets from 
a ﬁ  xed distance, and thus ignoring many 
aspects of the bee’s natural behavior.
All in all, there is no question that Adrian 
Horridge has made very signiﬁ  cant contri-
butions to the understanding of pattern rec-
ognition in bees, and that he has constructed 
a very plausible model of their behavior to 
small angle targets. His book is an excel-
lent introduction to the subject, despite, or 
even sometimes because, of his very opin-
ionated outlook. I say “despite”, because if 
one would believe him, the behavioral side 
of the studies are virtually ﬁ  nished, and they 
deﬁ  nitely are not. But also “because”, since 
a careful reading of the book will reveal the 
many interesting experiments of wide angle 
vision that remain to be done, along with 
the impetus that the reader is continually 
challenged to prove some of his most pro-
vocative statements wrong.
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